This paper studies singular mean field control problems and singular mean field stochastic differential games. Both sufficient and necessary conditions for the optimal controls and for the Nash equilibrium are obtained. Under some assumptions the optimality conditions for singular mean-field control are reduced to a reflected Skorohod problem, whose solution is proved to exist uniquely. Some examples are given. In particular, a simple singular mean-field game is studied where the Nash equilibrium exists but is not unique.
Introduction
The irreversible investment problem is a classical problem in economics, with a long history. In short, the problem is the following. A factory is facing an increased demand for its product. Should it invest in more production capacity to meet the demand? The problem is that buying additional production capacity is an expensive, irreversible investment (usually production equipment cannot easily be sold after use) and the future demand for the product is uncertain. So the risk is that the factory ends up having paid for an additional capacity it does not need. On the other hand, if the factory does not increase the capacity, it might miss an opportunity for an increased sale. This is a classical problem that has been studied by many authors in different contexts. See e.g. Pindyck (1988 , [16, 17, 18] , Kobila (1993) [8] and the references therein. Mathematically the problem can be formulated as a singular control problem. In this paper we study such singular control problems in the context of mean-field Itô processes and under model uncertainty. We interpret model uncertainty in the sense of Knight uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty about the underlying probability measure. Using the Girsanov theorem for Itô processes we can parametrize the family of densities of possible underlying probability measures by a stochastic process θ(t). This leads to a stochastic differential game in which one of the players is the investor controlling the investment strategy and the other player controls the model by choosing the model parameter θ. Since the investment is irreversible, the control of the investor is a singular control, i.e. a non-decreasing non-negative stochastic process ξ(t). Thus we are dealing with a singular mean-field stochastic differential game.
Recently, there have been several papers dealing with mean-field control problems. See e.g. Meyer-Brandis et al (2012) [9] , Anderson & Djehiche (2011) [1] and Hamadène (1998) [5] . A recent paper dealing with mean-field singular control is L. Zhang (2012) [22] . Our paper extends this paper in several directions: For example, we consider more general meanfield operators. And we allow the profit rate f (see below) to depend on the state X, on the mean-field term Y , and on the singular control ξ. We also allow both the coefficient λ in the singular part of the state equation and the singular cost coefficient h in the performance functional to depend on the state X. Moreover, we consider general games between two players of such singular control problems with asymmetric information.
Our paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present three motivating examples, In Section 3 we formulate the general mean-field singular stochastic control problem and prove a sufficient maximum principle and a necessary maximum principle. In Section 4 we reduce the maximum principle to a Skorohod problem and prove the existence and uniqueness of the solution. In Section 5 we prove a sufficient maximum principle for general singular mean-field stochastic games, and we obtain as a corollary a corresponding maximum principle for zerosum games. In Section 6 we apply the results above to an optimal harvesting problem of a mean-field system and to model uncertainty singular control, in particular model uncertainty irreversible investment type problems.
Three motivating examples 2.1 Optimal harvesting from a mean-field system
Suppose we model the size X 0 (t) of an unharvested population at time t by an equation of the form dX 0 (t) = E[X 0 (t)]b(t)dt + X 0 (t)σ(t)dB(t); t ∈ [0, T ] X 0 (0) = x > 0. (2.1)
Here, and in the following, B(t) = B(t, ω) is a Brownian motion on a filtered probability space (Ω, F , F := {F t } t≥0 , P ) satisfying the usual conditions. P is a reference probability measure. We assume that b(t) and σ(t) are given predictable processes. We may regard (2.1) as a limit as n → ∞ of a large population interacting system of the form
x j,n (t)]b(t)dt + x i,n (t)σ(t)dB i (t), i = 1, 2, ..., n.
(2.2)
Thus the mean-field term E[X(t)] represents an approximation to the weighted average 1 n n j=1 x j,n (t) for large n. Now suppose we introduce harvesting of the population. The size of the harvested population X(t) = X ξ (t) at time t can then be modeled by a mean-field singular control stochastic differential equation of the form
dX(t) = E[X(t)]b(t)dt + X(t)σ(t)dB(t) − λ 0 (t)dξ(t); t ∈ [0, T ]
where ξ(t) is a non-decreasing predictable process with ξ(0 − ) = 0, representing the harvesting effort, while λ 0 (t) > 0 is a given harvesting efficiency coefficient.
The performance functional is assumed to be of the form
where h 0 (t) is a given adapted price process and K = K(ω) is a given salvage price, assumed to be F T -measurable. The problem is to find ξ * such that
Such a process ξ * is called an optimal singular control. This is an example of a mean-field singular control problem. We will return to this problem in Section 6.1.
Optimal irreversible investments under model uncertainty
Let ξ(t) denote the production rate capacity of a production plant and let D(t) denote the demand rate at time t. At any time t the production capacity can be increased by dξ(t) at the price λ 0 (t, D(t)) per capacity unit. The number of units sold per time unit is the minimum of the demand D(t) and the capacity ξ(t).The total expected net profit of the production is assumed to be 6) where g(D(T )) is some salvage value of the closed-down production plant, ϕ is a given real function and a(t, E[ϕ(D(t))]) is the unit sales price of the production. Here {Q θ } θ∈Θ is a family of probability measures representing the model uncertainty. We let A G denote the set of right-continuous, non-decreasing G-adapted processes ξ(·) with ξ(0 − ) = 0, where G := {G t } t≥0 is a given subfiltration of F, in the sense that G t ⊆ F t for all t. Heuristically, G t represents the information available to the investor at time t. We assume that the demand D(t) is given by a jump diffusion of the form
where α(t, ω), β(t, ω) are given F-adapted processes. We want to maximize the expected total net profit under the worst possible scenario, i.e. find (ξ
This is an example of a (partial information) singular control game of a jump diffusion. Note that the system is non-Markovian, both because of the mean-field term and the partial information constraint. See Sections 6.2-6.4.
A mean field singular game
Suppose the demand X(t) for a certain product at time t is given by a mean field SDE of the form
There are two competing companies producing this product, with production rate capacities represented by nondecreasing adapted processes ξ 1 , ξ 2 , respectively. The expected profit of the company i is assumed to have to the form
where π(t) > 0 is the price per unit sold and h i (t) < 0 the production cost per unit for the factory i, i = 1, 2. We want to find a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a pair (ξ 3 Maximum principle for singular mean field control problems
Problem statement
We first recall some basic concepts and results from Banach space theory. Let V be an open subset of a Banach space X with norm · and let F : V → R.
(i) We say that F has a directional derivative (or Gâteaux derivative) at x ∈ X in the direction y ∈ X if
exists.
(ii) We say that F is Fréchet differentiable at x ∈ V if there exists a linear map L : X → R such that lim h→0 h∈X
In this case we call L the gradient (or Fréchet derivative) of F at x and we write
In particular, if X = L 2 (P ) the Fréchet derivative of F at X ∈ L 2 (P ), denoted by ∇ X F , is a bounded linear functional on L 2 (P ), which we can identify with a random variable in
Consider a mixed regular and singular controlled system with state process X(t) = X ξ,u (t) of the form
where
and F is a Fréchet differentiable operator on L 2 (P ). We assume that all the coefficients b, σ, λ, f, g and h are Fréchet differentiable (C 1 ) with respect to x, y, ξ, u with derivatives in L 2 (m × P ), where m denoted Lebesgue measure on [0, T ]. Note that we allow the coefficients to depend on both controls ξ and u. This might be relevant, for example, in harvesting models. See (4.26). The performance functional is assumed to be of the form
We may interpret the function f as a profit rate, g as a bequest or salvage value function and h as a cost rate for the use of the singular control ξ. We want to find (ξ * , u * ) ∈ A such that
Here A is a given family of G-predictable processes such that the corresponding state equation has a unique solution X such that ω → X(t, ω) ∈ L 2 (P ) for all t. We let A denote the set of possible values of u(t); t ∈ [0, T ] when (ξ, u) ∈ A.
A sufficient maximum principle for singular mean field control
In this subsection we prove a sufficient maximum principle for the singular control games described above. To this end, define the Hamiltonians H as follows:
The associated mean-field BSDE for the adjoint processes is
The sufficient maximum principle for this singular mean field control is stated as follows.
Theorem 3.1 (Sufficient maximum principle for mean-field singular control) Letξ,û ∈ A, with corresponding solutionsX(t),Ŷ (t),p(t),q(t) of (3.1) and (3.7). Suppose the following conditions hold
is concave with respect to
• (The conditional maximum property)
• (Variational inequality)
Then (ξ(t),û(t)) is an optimal control for J(ξ, u).
Proof. This theorem is a straightforward consequence of Theorem 5.1 below. We refer to the proof there.
A necessary maximum principle for singular mean field control
In the previous section we gave a verification theorem, stating that if a given control (ξ,û) satisfies (3.8)-(3.10), then it is indeed optimal for the singular mean field control problem. We now establish a partial converse, implying that if a control (ξ,û) is optimal for the singular mean field control problem, then it is a conditional critical point for the Hamiltonian.
To achieve this, we start with the setup of [12] as follows. For ξ ∈ A, let V(ξ) denote the set of G-adapted processes η of finite variation such that there exists δ = δ(ξ) > 0 satisfying
(3.11)
Then for ξ ∈ A and η ∈ V(ξ) we have, by our smoothness assumptions on the coefficients,
Note that by the chain rule we have
(3.14)
Moreover,
Theorem 3.2 (Necessary maximum principle for singular mean-field control problem) Suppose (ξ,û) ∈ A is optimal, i.e. satisfies (3.4) . Then
Moreover, the following variational inequalities hold.
Proof. To simplify the notation denotê
We need to prove that ifξ ∈ A G is optimal, i.e. if
thenξ satisfies the following variational inequalities:
and
To this end, choose ξ ∈ A G and η ∈ V(ξ) and compute
By the definition of H 0 we have
By the terminal condition of p(T ) (see (3.7)) we have
In particular, if we apply this to an optimal ξ =ξ for J we get, for all η ∈ V(ξ),
If we choose η to be a pure jump process of the form
Since this holds for all such η, we conclude that
Finally, applying (3.25) to
and then to
we get, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
With (3.26) and (3.27) the proof is complete.
The optimality conditions
Since there have already been studies (see e.g. [9] and references therein) on the usual (nonsingular) mean field control problems, let us consider only the singular control ξ, i.e. with no regular control u. The system that we shall deal with, is described by
The performance functional is
The auxiliary backward stochastic differential equation with mean field is dp(
To solve the above BSDE, we denote
We also denote
Then application of Equation (2.11) of [7] to the above backward SDE yields
Substituting this into the maximum principle equations (3.17), we see that the maximum principle consists of the following equations:
Thus here is the strategy to solve the maximum principle equations (4.1), (4.7) and (4.8), where the p(t) in (4.7) and (4.8) is given by (4.6): First, assuming that X is known, we solve the backward stochastic differential equation (4.3) with the terminal condition (4.4) to obtain (4.6). Then substitute it into (4.7). This way we obtain an equation which will describe the domain D in which the process X(t) must be all the time. We control the process X(t) in such a way that when the process is in the interior of the domain D, we don't do anything. When the process reaches the boundary of D, we exercise the minimal push to keep the process inside the domain D. Here are some detailed explanation of the above strategy:
The equations (4.7) and (4.8) are essentially an equation for the "domain" of the state X(t) and the condition for the singular control ξ to satisfy. The equation (4.7) can be complicated since the solution p(t) may depend on the paths of X, Y and the path of control ξ itself up to time t. Denote X t = (X(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t) the trajectory of X up to time t. Then p(t) can be represented in general as p(t) = p(X(t), Y (t), ξ(t)).
We now consider a slightly more general situation, where the singular control may be any finite variation process, not necessarily increasing. The increasing case corresponds to r(t, X t , Y t , ξ t ) = ∞ below.
Suppose that there are two functionals l, r :
3 → R with l ≤ r such that the equations (4.7) and (4.8) can be written as Then we are led to the problem of finding a finite variation (not necessarily increasing) control ξ for the system
satisfying (4.9) . This is a Skorohod type problem. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to the case when λ(t, x, y) = 1 .
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that the following hold 1. b and σ are uniformly Lipschitz continuous. Namely, there is a positive constant L such that
The same inequality holds for σ.
2. l and r are uniformly Lipschitz continuous, i.e.
for some κ < 1/4. The same inequality holds for l.
For any
Then, Equations (4.9)-(4.10) have a unique solution.
Proof. We shall apply the Banach fixed point theorem to prove the theorem. Let us denote by B the Banach space of all continuous adapted processes (X(t), ξ(t)) which are square integrable. More precisely, B = (X, ξ) , X and ξ are continuous and adapted and
From (4.9) and (4.10), we define the following mapping on B:
(4.14) where (Z, η) satisfies the inequalities:
and, in addition,
For every given continuous pair (X(t), ξ(t)) in B, by the condition (3), Theorem 2.6 and Corollary 2.4 of [3] the above Skorohod problem has a unique solution (Z(t), η(t)) and the solution pair (Z(t), η(t)) can be represented as
It is elementary that
From the expression of Ξ, we easily see that 
From (4.19) and then from the assumptions on l and r, we see that
By standard argument from stochastic analysis, we have
Thus we have
Combining the above inequality with (4.22), we have
If κ < 1/4, then we can choose t 0 such that 16κ 2 + Ct < 1 for all t ≤ t 0 . Thus from (4.23), we conclude that F is a contraction mapping from B to B. Following a routine argument, we see that the solution ξ(t), X(t) for the equations (4.9) and (4.10) up to time t 0 . Since the constant C in 16κ 2 + Ct does not depends on the initial condition, we repeat this procedure to solve the equations (4.9) and (4.10) for on the interval [0, T ].
Remark 4.2 From the proof of the theorem, we see that if we define the Picard iteration for n = 0, 1, 2, · · · ,
) will converge to the true solution (X(t), ξ(t)) in B. This may be used to construct the numerical solutions. Example 4.3 Let us consider an optimal harvesting problem where the population density X(t) at time t is described by the linear controlled system
We allow the coefficients b 0 and σ 0 to depend on the harvested amount ξ to model the situation where the harvesting has influence on the environment and hence on the population growth. We want to findξ such that
and g(x, y) = Kx (4.29)
with K > 0. Then from (4.5) we get
Since α is deterministic, we have for all t ≤ r ≤ T ,
Note that α(t, r) is a deterministic function. It is easy to see from (4.6) that
is a deterministic function. Thus we have
If furthermore we assume
where h 0 (t) is positive and κ is a constant, we get (noting that λ(t) = −1)
In this case, we can take
and r(t, x, y, ξ) = ∞ if κ < 0 .
(4.32)
Note that κ < 0 means that unit price goes up when the population goes down (which becomes more precious). In this case, we want keep the population above a thresholdh(t) =
It is interesting to note that when h 0 (t) is larger, this thresholdh 0 (t) is also larger. We have proved Theorem 4.4 Under the assumptions (4.28), (4.29) and (4.31), the solutionξ of the mean field singular control problem (4.27) is given by the solution (X,Ŷ ,ξ) of the Skorohod reflection problem (4.9) and (4.26), with the boundaries l and r given by (4.32).
Next, we continue the above example but with h being given by
Namely, we continue to assume (4.26)-(4.30). But we replace (4.31) by
where h 0 (t) is positive. Then, the inequalities (4.7) -(4.8) become
where We can also consider the case that h is given by (4.33) but with h 0 (t) < 0. In this case, the domain (4.7) will be either
X(t) ≤ h(t) or X(t) ≥h(t) .
The interested readers may write down similar result for this case as well.
5 General singular mean-field games
Statement of the problem
In this section we consider the stochastic game of two players, each of them is to maximize his/her singular mean-field performance. Denote ξ = (ξ 1 , ξ 2 ), u = (u 1 , u 2 ), w = (w 1 , w 2 ), λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 ), h = (h 1 , h 2 ) with h i = (h i,1 , h i,2 ), and let the pair w i = (ξ i , u i ) represent the control of player i ; i = 1, 2.
Suppose the process X(t) = X ξ,u (t) under control of the two players satisfy the following stochastic differential equation with jumps.
dX(t) = b(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t), ω)dt + σ(t, X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t), ω)dB(t)
+ λ(t, X(t), u(t), ω)dξ(t),
and F is a Fréchet differentiable operator on L 2 (P ). We put G i = {G i t } t≥0 where G i t ⊆ F t is the information available to player i at time t.The performance functional for player i is assumed to be on the form
We want to find a Nash equilibrium for this game, i.e. find (ξ *
and sup
Here A (i) is a given family of G (i) -predictable processes such that the corresponding state equation has a unique solution X such that ω → X(t, ω) ∈ L 2 (P ) for all t. We let A 
A sufficient maximum principle for the general non-zero sum case
Define two Hamiltonians H i ; i = 1, 2, as follows:
We assume that for i = 1, 2, H = H i is Fréchet differentiable (C 1 ) in the variables x, y, ξ, u.
The BSDE for the adjoint processes p i , q i is
(5.8)
Note that (5.8) is an operator valued BSDE for each ω.
2) with corresponding solutionsX,p i ,q i ,r i of (2.3) and (2.8). Assume the following:
are concave for all t; i = 1, 2.
• (The conditional maximum properties) ess sup
and ess sup
• (Variational inequalities) ess sup
is a Nash equilibrium, in the sense that (5.4) and (5.5) hold with
By introducing a suitable increasing sequence of stopping times converging to T , we see that we may assume that all local martingales appearing in the proof below are martingales. We refer to [15] for details. We first study the stochastic control problem (5.4). For simplicity of notation, in the following we put û 2 (t) , ω) and similarly with σ(t),σ(t).
Consider
, where
By the definition of H 1 we have
By concavity of g 1 and the Itô formula we have
where we have putX (t) := X(t) −X(t),σ(t) := σ(t) −σ(t).
Note that 19) and that
Combining (5.20) with I 3 and I 4 we get
whereĤ 1 (t) means that H 1 is evaluated at (t,X(t),Ŷ (t),ξ(t),û(t),p 1 (t),q 1 (t)), while H 1 (t) means that H 1 is evaluated at (t, X(t), Y (t), ξ 1 (t), u 1 (t),ξ 2 (t),û 2 (t),p 1 (t),q 1 (t)). Note that by concavity of H 1 we have
Therefore, to obtain that J 1 −Ĵ 1 ≤ 0, it suffices that
for all ξ 1 , and that
for all u 1 . The inequality (5.24) holds by our assumption (5.12), and the inequality (5.23) holds by our assumption (5.14). The difference
is handled similarly.
The zero-sum game case
In the zero-sum case we have To see this, note that (5.4)-(5.5) imply that
and hence
From this we deduce that inf
Since we always have inf sup ≥ sup inf, we conclude that
Hence we want to find (ξ * , θ
As shown in [13] , in this case only one Hamiltonian H is needed, namely
and we have put g i = g, h i = h 1,i ; i = 1, 2 and
Moreover, there is only one couple (p, q) of adjoint processes, given by the BSDE
(5.33)
We can now state the corresponding sufficient maximum principle for the zero-sum game:
Theorem 5.2 (Sufficient maximum principle for zero-sum singular mean-field games) Let (ŵ 1 ,ŵ 2 ) ∈ A 1 × A 2 , with corresponding solutionsX(t),Ŷ (t),p(t),q(t). Suppose the following holds
is concave for all t, the function
is convex for all t, and the function
is affine.
• (The conditional maximum property) ess sup
t ] (5.37) and ess inf
Proof. The proof is similar to (and simpler than) the proof of Theorem 5.1 and is omitted.
A necessary maximum principle for the general case
In Section 6.2 we proved a verification theorem, stating that if a given control (ξ,û) satisfies certain conditions, then it is indeed optimal for the singular control game. We now establish a partial converse, implying that it a control (ξ,û) is optimal for the singular control game, then it is a conditional saddle point for the Hamiltonian.
Theorem 5.3 (Necessary maximum principle for singular mean-field games)
2) constitute a Nash equilibrium for the game, i.e. satisfies (5.4) and (5.5). Then
Moreover, the following variational inequalities hold:
for all t, i = 1, 2 and
Proof. This theorem can be proved in a way similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2 with an adjustment to the stochastic game case. The adjustment is similar to one in the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Applications

Return to the optimal harvesting problem
To illustrate our results, we apply it to the optimal harvesting problem (2.3),(2.4) in Section 2.1: Here the Hamiltonian (3.12) gets the form
By Theorem 5.1 the corresponding BSDE reduces to dp(
with associated variational inequalities
The system consisting of (2.3),(2.4) combined with (6.2),(6.3) represents a mean-field forward-backward reflected SDE . Combining the above with the result of Section 4 we get: Theorem 6.1 Assume thatX(t),p(t),q(t),ξ(t) is a solution of the system (2.3),(2.4) & (6.2), (6.3) . Thenξ(t) is an optimal harvesting strategy for the problem (2.5). Heuristically the optimal harvesting strategy can be described as follows:
4)
then do nothing (chooseξ(t) = 0).
• Ifp
5)
then we harvest immediately fromX(t) at a rate dξ(t) which is exactly enough to preventX(t) from going above
.
• Ifp 
Application to model uncertainty singular control
We represent model uncertainty by a family of probability measures Q = Q θ equivalent to P , with the Radon-Nikodym derivative on F t given by
where, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , G θ (t) is an exponential martingale of the form
Here θ may be regarded as a scenario control. Let A 1 := A G denote a given family of admissible singular controls ξ and let A 2 := Θ denote a given set of admissible scenario controls θ such that
Now assume that X 1 (t) = X ξ (t) is a singularly controlled mean-field Itô process of the form
where 11) and F is a Fréchet differentiable operator on L 2 (P ). As before let G (1) = {G (1) t } 0≤t≤T and G (2) = {G (2) t } 0≤t≤T be given subfiltrations of F = {F t } 0≤t≤T , representing the information available to the controllers at time t. It is required that ξ ∈ A 1 be G
(1) -predictable, and θ ∈ A 2 be G (2) -predictable. We set w = (ξ, θ) and consider the stochastic differential game to find (ξ,θ) ∈ A 1 × A 2 such that
ρ(θ(t))dt] can be seen as a penalty term, penalizing the difference between Q θ and the original probability measure P . Note that since G θ (t) is a martingale we have
We see that this is a mean-field singular control stochastic differential game of the type discussed in Section 4, with a two-dimensional state space (6.15) and with
Using the result from Section 4, we get the following Hamiltonian for the game (6.12):
The corresponding mean-field BSDEs for the adjoint processes become
and dp 2 (t) = −{f 1 (t,
Minimizing the Hamiltonian with respect to θ gives the following first order condition:
The variational inequalities (5.14) -(5.15) reduce to
t ]dξ(t) = 0; (6.24)
A special case
For simplicity, consider the special case with
i.e., λ 1 and h 1 do not depend on x. Then, writing
, where G θ is given by (6.8) and
The performance functional becomes
and the Hamiltonian becomes
and dp
Then the first order condition for a minimum of the Hamiltonian with respect to θ 0 reduces to ρ ′ (θ)(t) = −q 2 (t). (6.32)
The variational inequalities (6.19) become
In general it seems to be a formidable mathematical challenge to solve such a coupled system of forward-backward singular SDEs. However, in some cases a possible solution procedure could be described, as in the next example:
Optimal harvesting under uncertainty
Now we consider a model uncertainty version of the optimal harvesting problem in Section 6.1. For simplicity we put K = 1. Thus we have the following mean-field forward system (X, ξ , G θ ), where G θ is given by (6.8) and
with performance functional
The model uncertainty harvesting problem is to find (ξ
Here the Hamiltonian is
Minimizing the Hamiltonian with respect to θ gives the first order equation
The corresponding reflected backward system is dp
with variational inequalities
Then we get the following result:
Theorem 6.2 Suppose there exists a solutionX(t) := Xξ(t),Ĝ(t) := Gθ(t),p 1 (t),q 1 (t),p 2 (t),q 2 (t),ξ(t),θ(t) of the coupled system of mean-field forward-backward singular stochastic differential equations consisting of the forward equations (6.34) and the reflected backward equations (6.39),(6.40), and satisfying the constraint (6.41). Thenξ(t) is the optimal harvesting strategy andθ(t) is the optimal scenario parameter for the model uncertainty harvesting problem (6.36).
A mean field singular game
We now return to the mean field singular game described in Section 2.3.
In this case, we get from (5.6) H i (t, x, y, ξ 1 , ξ 2 , p i , q i )(dt, ξ 1 (dy), ξ 2 (dt)) = π min(x, ξ 1 + ξ 2 ) + yb(t)p i + xσ(t)q i + h 1 ξ 1 (dt) + h 2 ξ 2 (dt) and the adjoint equations (5.8) becomes dp i (t) = − χ [0,ξ 1 +ξ 2 ) (x)π(t) + σ(t)q i (t) + b(t)p i (t) dt + q i (t)dB(t) ; p i (T ) = 0 .
The variational inequalities (5.43) get the form    π(t)χ [0,X(t)) (ξ 1 (t) + ξ 2 (t)) + h i (t) ≤ 0 and π(t)χ [0,X(t)) (ξ 1 (t) + ξ 2 (t)) + h i (t) ξ i (dt) = 0 ; i = 1, 2 .
Optimal strategy for factory 1:
i) If π(t) + h 1 (t) < 0, do nothing.
ii) If π(t) + h 1 (t) ≥ 0 increase ξ 1 (t) to X(t) − ξ * 2 (t). In other words, (ξ 1 , X) solves the reflected Skorohod problem ξ 1 (t) ≥ (X(t) − ξ * 2 (t))χ [0,∞) (π(t) + h 1 (t)) ξ 1 (t) − (X(t) − ξ * 2 (t))χ [0,∞) (π(t) + h 1 (t)) ξ 1 (dt) = 0 .
(6.42) So for given ξ * 2 we choose ξ 1 := R 1 (ξ * 2 ) solution of the reflected Skorohod problem (6.42). Similarly, given ξ * 1 we choose ξ 2 := R 2 (ξ * 1 ) as the solution of the reflected Skorohod problem ξ 2 (t) ≥ (X(t) − ξ * 1 (t))χ [0,∞) (π(t) + h 2 (t)) ξ 2 (t) − (X(t) − ξ * 1 (t))χ [0,∞) (π(t) + h 2 (t)) ξ 2 (dt) = 0 .
(6.43) Thus, to find the Nash equilibrium we need to solve the following coupled reflected Skorohod problem:
ξ 1 (t) ≥ (X(t) − ξ 2 (t))χ [0,∞) (π(t) + h 1 (t)) ξ 1 (t) − (X(t) − ξ 2 (t))χ [0,∞) (π(t) + h 1 (t)) ξ 1 (dt) = 0 ; ξ 2 (t) ≥ (X(t) − ξ 1 (t))χ [0,∞) (π(t) + h 2 (t)) ξ 2 (t) − (X(t) − ξ 1 (t))χ [0,∞) (π(t) + h 2 (t)) ξ 2 (dt) = 0 . The above system of reflected Skorohod problem can be solved in the following way: We divide the interval[0, T ] into 0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t n = T such that on each interval [t k , t k+1 ) the signs of π(t) + h 1 (t) and π(t) + h 2 (t) remains unchanged.
On each interval [t k , t k+1 ], we use the following control principles. If both of the inequalities π(t) + h 1 (t) < 0 and π(t) + h 2 (t) < 0 hold, then do nothing. If π(t) + h 1 (t) < 0 and π(t) + h 2 (t) ≥ 0, then the first factory does not do anything. The second condition in (6.44) becomes ξ 2 (t) ≥ (X(t) − ξ 1 (t)) [ξ 2 (t) − (X(t) − ξ 1 (t)))] ξ 2 (dt) = 0 . By Remark 2.7 (namely, Equation (2.8)) of [3] , ξ 2 (t) = sup
Thus, we keep ξ 1 (t) = ξ 1 (t k ) unchanged and in the same time increase ξ 2 (t) to X(t) − ξ 1 (t). Similar result holds if π(t) + h 1 (t) ≥ 0 and π(t) + h 2 (t) < 0. If both π(t) + h 1 (t) ≥ 0 and π(t) + h 2 (t) ≥ 0, then (6.44) becomes
[ξ 1 (t) − (X(t) − ξ 2 (t))] ξ 1 (dt) = 0 ; ξ 2 (t) ≥ (X(t) − ξ 1 (t)) [ξ 2 (t) − (X(t) − ξ 1 (t)))] ξ 2 (dt) = 0 . Let ξ(t) = ξ 1 (t) + ξ 2 (t) and then (6.45) is equivalent to ξ(t) ≥ X(t) [ξ(t) − X(t)] ξ(dt) = 0 .
Again by Remark 2.7 (namely, Equation (2.8)) of [3] , we have ξ(t) = sup t k ≤s≤t X(s) + , t k ≤ t ≤ t k+1 .
Now we show that any decomposition of ξ(t) into the sum of two nondecreasing processes ξ 1 (t) and ξ 2 (t) will solve (6.45). In fact, assume ξ(t) = ξ 1 (t) + ξ 2 (t), where ξ 1 and ξ 2 are two nondecreasing processes. Since ξ(t) ≥ X(t) and ξ 1 and ξ 2 are nondecreasing, we have This implies [ξ(t) − X(t)] ξ 1 (dt) = 0 [ξ(t) − X(t)] ξ 2 (dt) = 0 . Thus, ξ 1 and ξ 2 satisfies (6.45). Summarizing we have Theorem 6.3 Assume that we can divide the interval [0, T ] into 0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t n = T such that on each interval [t k , t k+1 ) the signs of π(t) + h 1 (t) and π(t) + h 2 (t) remain unchanged. Then we can recursively find the solution ξ 1 and ξ 2 on each interval [t k , t k+1 ] for k = 0, 1, · · · , n − 1. On the interval [t k , t k+1 ], we have (i) If both of the inequalities π(t) + h 1 (t) < 0 and π(t) + h 2 (t) < 0 hold, then do nothing.
(ii) If π(t) + h 1 (t) < 0 but π(t) + h 2 (t) ≥ 0, then ξ 1 (t) = ξ 1 (t k ) , t k ≤ t ≤ t k+1 and ξ 2 (t) = sup
If π(t) + h 1 (t) ≥ 0 but π(t) + h 2 (t) < 0, then ξ 2 (t) = ξ 2 (t k ) , t k ≤ t ≤ t k+1 and ξ 1 (t) = sup
(iii) If both of the inequalities π(t) + h 1 (t) ≥ 0 and π(t) + h 2 (t) ≥ 0 hold, then ξ 1 and ξ 2 can be any nondecreasing processes such that ξ 1 (t) + ξ 2 (t) = sup
Note in particular that in this case the Nash equilibrium is not unique.
